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Abstract
This paper asks two questions: i) how does the proximity and relative amount of
lending by competitors affect where a bank with a local capital shock adjusts supply
of credit? ii) do credit supply shocks have a lower impact on real activity if they help
the bank compete in the core markets of other lenders? Evidence shows that positive
shocks help offset distance-based information disadvantage and target markets far from
own branches and close to competitors’ branches. Negative shocks occur in competi-
tive, low-share markets with lower marginal return. Activity increases significantly in
concentrated markets when banks expand in their own or competitors’ core markets.
Residential booms decrease lending but do not reduce activity.
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1 Introduction
Banks frequently provide credit to a segment of the market with significant information
frictions. When lending locally, soft information gives banks an advantage in the proximity
of their branches and allows for increased competition at the periphery, where others gain
an advantage.1 Additional capital provides lenders an opportunity to expand their lending
portfolio close to competitors or in their own core markets, far from other lenders. Similarly,
when capital decreases, banks can reduce lending in either of the markets. The way capital
shocks are allocated to markets with different level of competition, has an implication for the
segmentation of credit markets and for the role of physical branches in preventing lending
from competing banks. For example, if a bank with additional capital does not lend more
close to the branches of a competitor, lending in the proximity is likely more expensive. The
existing evidence shows that branches minimize contracting frictions due to own distance to
borrowers.2 At the same time, there is less evidence about the role of branches in increasing
contracting frictions for other competing banks.
This paper asks two questions: i) how does the proximity and relative amount of lending
by competitors affect where a bank with a local capital shock adjusts the supply of credit?
ii) do credit supply shocks have a lower impact on real activity if they help the bank compete
in the core markets of other lenders? According to the literature on local lending, the share
of originations in a given location depends on the lender’s own distance to the borrower and
the distance of the borrower to other banks.3 The insight provides a starting point for the
empirical analysis in this paper and is key to how I distinguish which markets see credit
supply changes after two local capital shocks. I explicitly incorporate measures of bank-
borrower/competitor-borrower distance and the share of lending at the borrower’s census
1See Dell’Ariccia (2001) and Hauswald and Marquez (2006). Degryse and Ongena (2005) and Agarwal
and Hauswald (2010) show that competition increases with borrower-distance/competitor-proximity. The
loan share decreases as the information advantage erodes and the bank cannot offer sufficiently low rates.
2See Gilje et al. (2016), Corte´s and Strahan (2017) among others.
3This is caused by the superior soft information that a lender can generate when they are close to the
borrower. See Brevoort and Hannan (2006), Degryse and Ongena (2005), Hauswald and Marquez (2006),
and Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) for a discussion of the importance of borrower distance.
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tract as measures of local competition. Both can explain where and how much a bank lends
within and across counties and how much credit supply and real activity shift after capital
shocks. The existing literature primarily focuses on whether lending changes in counties
with/without own branches, identifying the role of the own distance-to-borrower information
advantage in a starkly discontinuous way.4 This ignores the presence of other lenders and
does not explain how credit is allocated within or across counties with branches.5 Degryse
and Ongena (2005) and Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) show that the location of other lenders
is key to where a bank lends. Furthermore, Corte´s and Strahan (2017) suggests that, for
smaller banks, most of mortgage lending is close to branches, implying that loans in no-
branch counties make up a small fraction of the portfolio.6 Therefore, the existing evidence
does not explain how capital shocks are distributed across the markets where banks lend the
most and whether the location of other lenders plays an important role.
My main results examine small business loans by regional banks which face incentives
to reallocate capital due to their exposure to fracking windfalls and residential booms. I
explore a different credit segment relative to the existing evidence, which focuses on mortgage
lending. Business lending is more local, is subject to higher information frictions, and can
be directly linked to employment outcomes. I use a novel dataset that combines the joint
spatial distribution of borrowers and lenders, and identifies lending in each census tract by
branches of each bank. This level of detail allows me to measure how far other lenders are
and what their share of lending within each tract is. I estimate a difference-in-difference
model, which relies on the significant existing variation to account for time-invariant branch
or branch-borrower heterogeneity and time-varying census-tract demand shocks.7
4See Gilje et al. (2016), Corte´s and Strahan (2017). Papers also examine how credit segments subject to
greater contracting frictions respond to capital shocks.
5While it is true that the contracting frictions are higher in counties where banks do not have branches
compared to where they do, the information advantage can vary within and across counties where banks
have branches depending on the distance of competitors to borrowers.
6Brevoort and Hannan (2006) suggests that this is the case for business lending as well.
7The dataset draws on the CRA lending data and SOD branch data. CRA refers to the Community
Reinvestment Act data on small business lending. SOD refers to the Summary of Deposits data by FDIC
which lists bank branch locations.
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I start by confirming the existing evidence that fracking and residential booms incentivize
capital reallocation and show that business lending is also affected, primarily at small banks:
fracking raises lending in outlying markets, while booms lead to lending reductions. This
sets the stage for my focus on small banks and the two sets of findings related to lending.8
First, using only local loan share and exposure to capital shocks, I show that originations
are more sensitive to capital shocks at census tracts of borrowers where the bank provides
a smaller fraction of the overall credit. In particular, credit increases more in lower-share
census tracts after a positive capital shock. The result is not in line with Gilje et al. (2016)
which shows that credit does not increase in no-branch counties, which are likely low-share
markets. It implies that the logic from how banks adjust in no-branch counties does not carry
over to all markets and emphasizes that lending by competitors may be an important factor.
I further find that credit decreases more in low-share census tracts following a negative
capital shock. This appears to be driven by markets where the branches of both the affected
bank and its competitors are close to each other. This result is somewhat at odds with Corte´s
and Strahan (2017) who find that banks reduce lending in no-branch counties. Instead, I
show that reductions occur where all banks have lower shares.
In the second set of findings I control for the loan share, the distance of borrowers to
own and competing branches, and further cut the sample into census tracts close/far from
competitors. I show that banks use additional capital to expand the share in census tracts
that are close to competitors’ branches. I also find evidence that lending increases in tracts
where competitors are far from the borrower but the affected bank is close. Expanding close
to competitors suggests that positive capital shocks allow banks to lend where they are at
an informational disadvantage. This is a new result from the perspective of Gilje et al.
(2016) which suggests that banks expand only where they have an information advantage.
It appears that while banks prefer to expand in counties with own branches, they also focus
on markets where the benefit of their local presence is offset by the proximity of competitors.
8Bank size is defined based on the number of branches. Small banks have less than 30 branches.
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In the case of real estate booms, I find that banks contract primarily in markets where their
branches are close to branches of competitors, i.e. where both have similar information
advantage. Since these markets are likely more competitive locations with lower contracting
frictions, this finding is consistent with conclusion of Corte´s and Strahan (2017) that banks
cut where they are not able to generate rents. Still, contrary to that paper, I do not find
contractions far from own branches, in markets where the bank has no physical presence.
All together, the evidence suggests that positive capital shocks allow banks to overcome
the information disadvantage they face when lending close to competitors, besides also help-
ing them lend more where they have superior local information. During contractions banks
reduce originations mostly in competitive markets with lower relative return, where they
have the same information advantage as their competitors. They maintain lending to bor-
rowers close to their own branches and far from the competition, as well as in the markets
far from own branches and close to the competitors.
The results in the literature on local capital shocks highlight the importance of local
branches in alleviating contracting frictions with local borrowers. Expansions occur only in
counties with branches, since frictions are lower when the bank distance to the borrower
is smaller. My evidence further extends these results by showing that local branches can
prevent but not fully eliminate lending by competitors, since only banks with lower cost of
funding can expand in the proximity. Furthermore, lending close to competitors is valuable
since originations in the proximity are not reduced during negative capital shocks. This
suggests that maintaining a physical branch close to borrowers can not only reduce the bank’s
contracting frictions with borrowers but also help limit competition from other lenders.
Having established that capital shocks lead to important changes in the credit supply
by individual banks, I evaluate the overall effect of these on total credit supply and real
activity. I show that the average census tract exposed to positive supply shocks, experiences
and increase in total business lending and business activity (measured by the number of small
business establishments). Since the lending results show that banks lend more in tracts where
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they have an information disadvantage and also where they have better information, I report
results based on the local share of affected banks and the level of competition in the census
tract. In particular, I examine whether increased credit supply by banks with a small share
of local lending can increase total credit and real activity in tracts that are less competitive.
This allows me to tests whether the expansion by banks in census tracts where they have
an information disadvantage has real effects. The evidence indicates that this is indeed
the case. I show that positive credit supply shocks increase the number of establishments
in tracts close to the branches of competitors and far from the branches of the expanding
bank. I also show that activity increases when affected banks lend more close to their own
branches and far from competitors. Finally, the evidence suggests that exposure to banks
in residential booms reduces total lending but not overall activity. Activity is only lower in
markets with bigger reductions compared to other exposed locations.
Positive shocks allow banks to expand in valuable markets: their own core markets and
the core markets of competitors, where they lack information advantage. This not only
raises total market credit but also increases activity. My results highlight a different aspect
of the lending channel – credit supply shocks have real effects in markets where lenders have
lower information advantage. Exposure to fracking reduces funding costs, allowing banks to
offset their informational disadvantage and compete in markets dominated by competitors.
This mechanism is reminiscent of the effect of the de-regulation of banking, which improved
bank competition and increased real activity.9 Finally, I show that negative capital shocks
decrease total credit supply but not the number of loans which suggests that businesses are
able to substitute credit, likely since this occurs in competitive markets or in areas closer to
competitors, where credit alternatives are available.
I show that fracking or residential booms proximity increases small bank liquidity and
profitability, driving supply reallocation. One standard deviation increase in fracking expo-
sure raises branch/bank deposits by 4.3%/.6%, between 2000 and 2010. Tract credit increases
9See Cetorelli (2001, 2002); Cetorelli and Strahan (2006).
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by 9.5%, with branch fixed effects and tract demand controls. One standard deviation higher
network fraction where residential appreciation is over the 97th percentile, during 2000 to
2005, increases yield by 7-13bps. Capital is allocated to booms, reducing tract credit by
21%. The profitability and liquidity of big banks appears to be less sensitive to local shocks.
I find that originations are more sensitive in small-share markets both for contraction and
expansions. When the tract loan share is 10% below the bank average, the positive/negative
supply effects are 50%/23% bigger in magnitude. To further understand the role of proxim-
ity to competitors, I divide the sample by borrowers close/far from competitors, including
the loan share and distance to borrowers as explanatory variables. For borrowers close to
competitors, expansions are 9% higher when the loan market share is 10% blow the average.
For borrowers far from competitors, expansions increase with proximity to own branches.
In the latter case, originations are 38% higher when the branch and borrower share a tract.
With residential booms, banks reduce more when both their own and competitors’ branches
are close to borrowers: originations are 83% lower. When competitors are relatively far,
banks decrease lending at an intermediate distance to other banks with a similar magnitude.
Tract credit and activity evidence is based on exposure to banks with below/above-
average market shares. One standard deviation higher fracking exposure to below/above-
average-share banks increases credit by 2.6% (in both cases) and small establishments by
1.1%/0.5%. In the middle/bottom HHI markets low-share lenders increases activity by
0.8%/1.2%. In the rest, high-share lenders increase activity by 1%. Exposure to residential
booms reduces total credit between 2.6% and 2.9%. The lower credit supply has no real
impact in all but the top HHI markets, where activity decreases relative to tracts with
exposure to low-share lenders.
Section 2 lists related literature and contributions. Section 3 discusses data sources. Sec-
tion 4 defines bank exposure and sample selection. Section 5 shows the bank-level incentives
for capital reallocation. Section 6 and 7 deal with credit supply and its effect on total credit
and real activity. Section 8 includes robustness/extensions and 9 concludes the paper.
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2 Related Literature
The paper contributes to the literature on intra-bank capital allocations of local shocks.
Bustos et al. (2016) and Gilje et al. (2016) examine the effect of local liquidity shocks.
Chakraborty et al. (2018) study the impact of exposure to residential booms, while Berrospide
et al. (2016) focus on busts.10 My key contribution to this literature is with the introduc-
tions of measures of competition from other lenders. Most of the existing studies examine the
importance of distance-based information frictions by comparing how shocks propagate to
counties with/without branches. They suggest that local branches primarily alleviate these
lending frictions. My results highlight that branches are important for banks as a way to
prevent other lenders from providing credit in the proximity. I recognize that the distance to
the borrower does not accurately capture the relative information advantage of lending since
the proximity of other lenders will exacerbate the contracting frictions (Dell’Ariccia (2001)).
I show that the intuition about where banks allocate credit shocks relative to their own
branches does not carry over when one considers the location of other competitors. More
specifically, a bank with a positive shock lends more where other lenders are closer and it
is at a relative disadvantage. I also provide evidence that this lending expansion increases
business activity and does not simply allow businesses to substitute for cheaper credit. My
results help identify how the real effect of credit supply shocks differs by the level of com-
petition in the local market. Finally, I contribute to the literature by showing that most of
the existing results, which use mortgage lending, hold for the case of business originations.
The paper is related to the literature on the importance of local information in bank
lending. A key premise in my empirical results comes from Degryse and Ongena (2005)
who show that the distance between the borrower and competing lenders can significantly
relax the pricing competition. I also rely on Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) who further
show that the share of lending decreases with the borrower distance to competitors. The
10For examples of other local shocks see Corte´s and Strahan (2017), Bord et al. (2017), Chavaz (2014),
and Loutskina and Strahan (2015)
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models of Hauswald and Marquez (2006) and Dell’Ariccia (2001) emphasize the variation in
information disadvantage and the increase in asymmetric information for borrowers close to
competitors. My results suggest that the lower cost of funding helps banks lend in markets
where the asymmetric information makes lending more expensive. I also show that banks
limit reductions in credit these markets when they have lower capital.
This paper also contributes to the expansive literature on the effect of financial com-
petition on economic growth. This literature uses the branching deregulation legislature
and the resulting increase in banking competition across the US to examine its effect on
local activity as in Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) and Jayaratne and Strahan (1996). My
evidence suggests that local shocks allow banks to compete in concentrated markets with
higher frictions, where they previously have not be able to. This mirrors the effect of dereg-
ulation. The evidence emphasizes that branch deregulation can have a positive impact on
activity when banks have sufficient cost advantage, which allows them to gain market share
in high-frictions markets.
3 Data Sources
Credit Data: Credit information comes from the detailed filings required under the Com-
munity Reinvestment Act.11 These include the combined gross originations amounts and
count for commercial and industrial loans and loans with values of less than $1 million se-
cured by nonresidential real estate. Banks report total credit for each county by the relative
income group of borrowers. Each census tract has an income group and shows if it has orig-
inations. This allows me to identify tract originations, if tracts have unique relative county
income category.12 Branch locations come from the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits. The
paper uses expected originations which combine tract lending and origination probability.
I link branch locations to borrowers’ tract, assuming that a closer branch is more likely to
11This includes of independent commercial banks and savings institutions with more than $250 million in
assets or banks owned by a bank-holding company with more than $1 billion in total assets
12For tracts with the same income category I distribute the reported credit equally.
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originate a loan. I assign tract originations to branches within 25% of the closest-branch
distance, using the inverse of the distance to assign the probability. Since this allocation will
link originations to all branches if a tract is relatively far from the network, I allocate tracts
above the 90th percentile, or those linked to more than five branches, to the bank headquar-
ter. I repeat the algorithm for each lending tract and for each bank. For more information
on this allocation, consult the online data appendix. I aggregate originations at the branch
and test whether offices outside the shock areas lend differently relative to other branches in
the same town, controlling for branch heterogeneity. For the main results, I analyze branch
originations at census tracts, comparing them to the amount that other banks originate in
the same tract, controlling for branch-tract heterogeneity.
Bank and Real Activity Data: Bank balance sheet data comes from the Call Reports
provided by the FDIC and linked to the credit data using the bank certificate number. The
balance sheet and income statement variables are as of the last reporting quarter. In order
to identify the effect of exposure to local shocks independently from other differences in the
bank characteristics, I include a set of balance sheet controls from the Call Reports.
Data on the number of establishments is taken from the County Business Patterns (CBP).
CBP is maintained by the US Census and provides detailed information on the annual
number of businesses with paid employees as of March 12th. I use the information at the zip-
code level and convert it to census tracts based on population weights from the 2000 Census.
For each tract I have the number of establishments by size of employment by the two-digit
industry code. This allows me to examine how the whole distribution of establishments for
each industry is affected by supply shocks in different census tracts.
Fracking and Residential Boom Data: Fracking data comes from the U.S. Geological
Survey, which examines the development of drilling with hydraulic fracturing up to 2010
(Gallegos and Varela (2015)). The data has locations of both horizontal and directional wells
by the 8-digit hydrologic unit code areas (HUC). The HUCs are comparable to counties in
size but do not overlap since they enclose distinct parts of water bodies. The coordinates of
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each branch help assign it to a HUC and infer the number of drilling wells in the proximity.
The existing fracking literature shows that the purchase of the rights to drill provides a
significant payments for the owner of the land (Plosser (2014)). I use the the number of new
horizontal and directional wells in a given area to capture deposit growth.
Residential appreciation comes from Zillow’s real estate index. The index is a quality-
adjusted median value of housing for a given zip-code, town/city, and county. I construct
bank exposure to booms based on the appreciation of real estate in the branch census-
designated places (CDP). CDPs can be town, cities, or parts of counties. I use the average
zip-code and city index data, when available, and the county data when missing. Residential
appreciation is based on the CDP’s index growth rate.
4 Bank Exposure and Sample Selection
This paper differentiates between small banks, with less than 30 branches, and big institu-
tions.13 The literature has provided theoretical and empirical arguments for the difference
in the business model and customers of banks of varying size and geographical scope.14
Smaller banks can be subject to informational frictions in capital markets, making them
more dependent on internal capital sources. Higher liquidity affects total bank capital at
these institutions, not just the composition. Banks that can increase capital will not generate
cross-branch spillovers due to local shocks.
Definition of Fracking Exposure: New fracking wells can lead to a windfall for the
land owner. I assume that each branch in the HUC receives a windfall with a likelihood
based on the local deposit share. This implies that the same well increase leads to a lower
expected deposit growth for branches with more competition. Bank i’s exposure is:
Expi,t =
∑
bj,i,t∈Bi,t
NewWellsj,t ×
Depj,i,t
TotalDepj,t
(1)
13This definition roughly corresponds to banks with less than $1.1 billion in assets.
14See Berger et al. (2005) and Berger et al. (2001).
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Bi,t is a set of all bank branches, NewWellsj,t is total new wells in a hydrological unit area,
j, Depj,i,t is total deposits for bank i branches in the HUC.
15 The measure in the main results
is further restricted based on the branch-level deposit evidence. In particular, the branch
results show that proximity to new wells generates additional deposits only in the South
Atlantic, West South Central, and Mountain Census divisions. Therefore, I define bank
level exposure only based on branches which experience deposit growth related to fracking.
This restricts the sample of affected banks to only those with branches in these areas.16 The
period of the sample is between 2000 and 2010.
Definition of Exposure to Residential Booms: Rising house prices indicate an
underlying local productivity shock or amenities-driven higher demand for housing (Moretti
(2011)). I measure bank exposure to such conditions by examining which markets allow
banks to increase the return on assets and net interest margin, in the run-up to the recession
between 2000 and 2005. I compare performance for institutions with varying loan-weighted
fraction of branches in markets at different part of the regional appreciation distribution.
Results are shown in Table A1 in the online appendix.17 I find that presence in the top 97th
percentile is most strongly associated with higher earning performance, with a weaker but
positive relationship down to the 91st percentile. Formally the measure of exposure is:
Expi,t =
∑
bj,i,t∈Bi,t
I(Boom)j,i,t ×
SBLj,i,t−1
TotalSBLi,t
(2)
where each branch of bank i is located in a given CDP j. I(Boom)j,i,t indicates if location j
of branch i is in the top 97th percentile of residential appreciation for the region, SBLj,i,t−1
is total lagged small business loans in that location by the branch, and TotalSBLi,t is total
bank lending. The period of the sample is between 2000 and 2005. In all specifications, I
15Bank exposure can be calculated as the total new wells, adjusted for deposit market share, across the
entire bank network. I do not use a bank weighted average of branch exposure because new liquidity by
assumption will change the relative deposit share in each of the bank markets.
16I further limit exposed banks to those with 90th percentile of borrower distance below 60 miles to focus
on regional banks.
17I test whether a higher fraction of branches in locations in the top 99th percentile is associated with
higher yield on earning assets, repeating this for fraction of branches throughout the top decile.
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exclude areas that experience residential appreciation in the top 91st percentile.
Table 1 reports summary statistics at the level of banks by the level of exposure. Small
banks with and without exposure to fracking differ by total deposits and interest expense.
This is consistent with the assumption that proximity to fracking improves liquidity. Com-
paring small banks based on their presence in the top 97th percentile markets shows that
positive exposure is associated with higher yield on earning assets and net interest margin.
5 Bank Incentives for Capital Reallocation
The identification in the paper relies on local, non-systemic factors which provide a bank
incentive to reallocate capital and adjust the spatial loan portfolio distribution. The shocks
help interpret credit changes in the network, outside the direct impact, as supply driven.
Branches in locations close to fracking wells or residential booms can affect the overall
bank balance sheet and income statement. I show that fracking exposure changes total
deposits and interest expense. Branch deposit information shows that this is related to new
fracking wells in the same hydrological area. Increases in deposits expand bank capital,
reduce cost of funds, and allow banks to increase credit, particularly if they have limited
capital-raising ability. Residential booms allow banks to lend at a higher interest, increasing
the yield on earning assets and net interest margin, through capital reallocation.
Branch deposits data can identify where fracking wells increase liquidity by estimating:
Depi,j,t = α
SizeiNewWellsHUC,t + γX
i
t−1 + φi,j + σmetro,t + ǫ
i
b,t
(3)
Depi,j,t is the log of deposits at branch j of bank i. The effect of new wells in the proximity,
NewWellsHUC,t, varies with bank size. Banks with less than 30 offices are designated as
small. φi,j is a branch fixed effect. σmetro,t controls for annual variations in deposit at the
metropolitan area. X it−1 includes bank controls which account for bank-level shocks.
18
18Control variables include the lags of Log of Assets, Deposits/Assets, C&I Loans/Assets, Mortgage
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The total bank impact of each shock is estimated with the following model:
Yi,t = α
SizeiExpi,t + γX
i
t−1 + φi + σstate,t + ǫ
i
i,t
(4)
Yi,t is log deposits, deposit cost, yield on assets, or net interest margin. Expi,t is bank
exposure to fracking or residential booms, φi/σstate,t are bank/state-year fixed effects. The
state-year fixed effect controls for the differential regional shocks by the HQ state. Idiosyn-
cratic errors are clustered by the bank state. The effect of exposure varies by bank size as
capital spillovers are more important for capital-constrained banks. Additionally, in the case
of liquidity, regional increases in deposits will not have the same effect on national banks as
on smaller banks. The profitability of national banks is also not expected to be significantly
influenced by regional residential booms. I further examine how results vary by the Census
region. This narrows down areas where local exposure affects capital reallocation.
Estimates of models (3) and (4) in Table 2 suggest that proximity to fracking has a
significant bank and branch impact. In column (1), one deviation increase in small/big
branch exposure of 1.8/4.1 wells raises branch deposits by 4.3%/2.2%, suggesting that land
owners may be more likely to use a smaller bank. Column (2) breaks down the effect by the
branch region, indicating that small-bank effects are significant only in the South and West
regions, while big-bank branches see increases everywhere. Columns (3) and (4) show that
the increases in branch deposit aggregate up to the bank level only for smaller regional banks.
One deviation increase in exposure (4.3 wells) leads to a 0.6% increase in total deposits and a
3 bps decrease in deposit cost. Fracking exposure and the resulting branch deposits provide
a significant increase in liquidity without cost increases. Big banks are not affected, implying
that jumps in branch deposit are small in relative terms. I restrict bank exposure in what
follows to banks with branches in the South and West regions since only they are significant.
Table 2 also shows that residential booms increase profitability. One deviation increase
in exposure of 0.38 in columns (5) and (6), raises the yield on assets and the interest margin
Loans/Assets, Unused Loan Commitments / Assets, and the change in the number of branches.
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by close to 5bps. The increase is even bigger – between 7-13bps – when the effect is allowed
to vary by region, in columns (7) and (8). The results likely underestimate the increase in
profitability because the non-exposure group includes banks with branches in areas in the
top decile of appreciations, which also can experience some increase in profitability. Booms
impact the relative profitability across all regions except for the Northeast.19 As a results,
I restrict the definition of exposure to booms by excluding this region. Bigger banks are
not affected, highlighting that systemic, rather than regional shocks are more important in
explaining variation in the profitability of these banks.
6 Credit Supply Shocks
Increases in local deposits and profitability impact capital and expected return for the whole
institution. More deposits from fracking raise bank capital available for credit. Increase in
interest borrowers in residential booms are willing to pay raises the implicit return to capital
for all branches and limits capital at offices outside. When exposure to these shocks is partial,
the incentive to reallocate links branches and leads to changes in supply at outlying offices.
Credit supply shocks are identified by comparing originations across banks with varying
exposure in outlying markets. For the main results, I use branch originations in borrower’s
census-tract and compare to lending by other tract lenders, assuming common tract shocks.
The baseline credit supply shocks are identified with the following empirical model:
Yi,j,m,t = α
sExpi,t + βXi,t−1 + φi,j,m + ηm,t + ǫi,j,m,t (5)
Yi,j,m,t is log of small business lending by branch j of bank i, in tract m. The effect of bank
exposure, Expi,t, varies by bank size, and this is made explicit with the index s, for small
banks. φi,j,m controls for the time-invariant tract differences in originations and rules out
19Funding costs and yield increase for banks in the Western region, possibly due to the tougher competition
for deposits in booming areas. The increase in yield still provides an important incentive to reallocate capital.
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the identification of supply shocks by permanent differences in borrowers. ηm,t controls for
time-varying differences in tract originations. Xi,t−1 includes bank controls listed above and
big bank exposure. I exclude tracts directly affected by the liquidity or profitability shocks.20
The identification of supply shocks is based on branch tract originations relative to own
long-term levels and other banks in the tract. I will not identify these if borrowers of exposed
banks have differential demand shocks. Within the same tract, borrowers face the same local
factors and common credit variations, accounted with tract-year FE, capture local demand
shifts. Results from model (5) with Expi,t−1 and Expi,t, show that only Expi,t−1 matters for
fracking and only Expi,t is significant for booms. I, therefore, use lagged fracking exposure
and current booms exposure below. The lending increase that follows higher liquidity rules
out timing inconsistencies. No delay in the case of residential booms suggests that banks
take advantage of current shocks that improve profitability in these areas.
Spatial competition implicitly constrains where banks will allocate capital. The small
business lending literature argues that transportation costs or strategic acquisition of soft
information shapes local competition and affects the loan distribution. Information accuracy
declines with distance, allowing banks to originate a bigger share closer to their branches
and a smaller share closer to competitors. The latter markets are more contested since the
bank is constrained by lower information quality and a minimum loan term it can offer. I
first examine the importance of market share as a proxy of the effects of local competition:
Yi,j,m,t = α
sExpi,t + γ
sExpi,tShi,j,m,t−1 + σ
sShi,j,m,t−1 + βXi,t−1 + φi,j,m + ηm,t + ǫi,j,m,t (6)
Shi,j,m,t−1 is lagged loan share of branch j of bank i in tract m. I center the share at the bank
average which implies that αs represents the average supply effect. Positive share captures
supply shocks at above-average-share markets and negative share captures those below.
The market share reflects factors of spatial competition as well as the marginal return
to capital, bank specialization, first-mover advantage, among others. To account for these
20In the case of residential booms I exclude areas within the 91th percentile of appreciation.
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independently of local spatial competition, I add distance to own branches and competitors:
Yi,j,m,t = α
s
1
Expi,t + γ
s
1
Expi,tShi,j,m,t−1 + γ
s
2
Expi,tRemComi,j,m + γ
s
3
Expi,tClLendi,j,m
+σs
1
Shi,j,m,t−1 + β1Xi,t−1 + φi,j,m + ηm,t + ǫi,j,m,t
(7)
RemComi,j,m is the remoteness to competitors: 1-(1/(1+DistanceToCompetitors)) and ClLendi,j,m
is closeness to lender: (1/(1+BorrowerDistance)).21 Increases in each represent more favor-
able position for the lender due to the relative information advantage and an implicit higher
share. When both measures are at zero, borrowers are close to competitors and far from the
originating branch. At 1 borrowers are close to the originator and far from competitors. I
further estimate the model after splitting the sample into markets close/far from competi-
tors based on a cutoff value for RemComi,j,m.
22 This helps to identify supply changes in
competitive markets, which are both close to competitors and the originating branch, and
in contested ones, which are close to competitors but far from the originating branch.
γs
2
, and γs
3
are coefficients of interest in this specification. Positive estimates suggest
that originations are higher when exposed banks enjoy an information advantage. With
negative estimates, originations are higher in markets where banks face more competition
and soft information about borrowers is less accurate. In the context of positive supply
shocks, negative estimates imply that banks expand in more contested markets, while positive
estimates indicate higher originations in their own core markets.
The baseline estimates in Table 3 show significant supply changes due to fracking and
residential boom exposure, which go in the opposite direction and depend on the level of
competition in the market. In columns (1), tract originations increase by 9.3%, for one
standard deviation increase in bank exposure, equal to 4.3. Estimates from models (6)
and (7) show that the supply effect decreases with the existing market share and increases
21BorrowerDistance is distance from the branch to the boundary of the borrower tract. DistanceToCom-
petitors is average distance of the rest of the lenders in the tract, excluding the 15% most distant lenders.
22For the fracking sample, markets below 0.9 for RemComi,j,m are Close; for the booms sample, those
below 0.8 are Close. I use two different values because the distribution of RemComi,j,m in the case of
fracking and booms is slightly different.
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with the distance to competitors. In column (2), 10% below-average market share raises
lending by 50% or 15.4% in total. Conversely, markets where banks enjoy higher market
share experience smaller supply shocks. Column (3) shows that expansions are higher close
to competitors: at 0.8 competitor remoteness, the supply effect is double the baseline and
increases closer to competitors. In column (4), I include both the share and distance and
find that only share is significant, with a similar magnitude as in column (2). This indicates
that the share captures information factors proxied by distance. Lending increases more in
markets with lower share because these are generally close to competitors. In column (5), I
focus on the sample of markets close to competitors. Since competitors in this sample are
close, the distance of the originating bank tells us if the market is competitive or is the core
market of a competitor, where the originating bank lacks an information advantage. I find
that the magnitude of the effect of share is even bigger, while distance is not important.
The effect of exposure, at 10% below the average market share, is 55% higher, compared to
the same effect for the whole sample. The fact that closeness of the lender is not significant
indicates that originations increase both when the bank is located in the same market and
when it is farther away. In other words, expansions occur in small-share markets both in
the core markets of competitors and in competitive markets. In column (6), which uses
the sample of markets far from competitors, closeness to lender is positive and is the only
significant coefficient. Expansions occur mostly close to the affected banks, where they have
a higher information advantage. The magnitude of the supply effect is much higher in the
banks’s core markets, compared to the expansion in small-share markets. In the core markets,
the effect of exposure is 0.09 when the originating branch is in the same tract as the borrower
and in the competitor’s core or competitive markets it is 0.02 at 10% below average market
share. The results suggest that positive capital shocks are not only allocated to the bank’s
core markets. They also help expand market share in competitors’ core markets, where the
improved financial position allows the bank to overcome its information disadvantage, as
well as in more competitive areas.
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The results in Table 3 for residential booms show that there are substantial credit reduc-
tions in outlying tracts. One standard deviation increase in exposure, equal to 0.38, leads to
21% lower originations. A small difference in the yield seems sufficient to induce a relatively
substantial reallocation of capital. Allowing for variation in market share in column (8),
shows that credit reductions are bigger below the average market share: lending decreases
an additional 23% in markets with 10% below-average share, or 26% in total. When only
distance measures are included in column (9), credit reductions are strongest in markets
closest to competitors. When both share and distance are included in column (10), both
preserve their magnitude but the effect of the share is still significant, while remoteness of
competitors is marginally significant. As in the case of fracking, the effect of share reflects
factors of information advantage and the effect of distance is not significant once the share
is included. The estimates from the full sample suggest that reductions are strongest with
small market shares, close to competitors. The sample of markets close to competitors in
column (11) shows that banks reduce more when borrowers are close to both their own and
competitor branches. With borrowers in the same tract, lending decreases by 83% at median
exposure of 0.9. Originations decrease primarily in competitive markets and not core mar-
kets of competitors, as with fracking. If competitors are close and originating branches are
at maximum distance, lending does not change. The sample of markets far from competi-
tors in column (12) indicates that banks decrease lending regardless of the share but this is
still done when borrowers are relatively closer to competitors. This shows that banks avoid
changing originations in their own core markets and adjust at intermediate distance to the
competition. This explains why in the full sample credit decreases in small-share markets:
these are either competitive ones or away from own or competitors’ core markets.
The allocation of capital, which incentivizes banks to both decrease and increase supply
across their network, reveals how valuable markets with different share and information
advantage are. Higher capital is used to expand market share in their own core markets and
the core markets of competitors, where other local lenders enjoy an information advantage.
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The share in these markets is important for banks. This is supported not only by the fact
that they expand their share when they have more capital but also by the fact that the
markets are sheltered during decreases in capital. Both increases and decreases in capital
lead to changes in the supply in the competitive markets. Since returns in these markets
are likely low, it is not surprising that capital reductions lead to credit contractions in these
markets. The fact that lending also increases there after increases in capital suggests that
banks have some other advantage or that capital increases exceed the amount of profitable
projects in the core and contested markets.
The pattern of capital allocation also shows that credit supply shocks are asymmetric.
Higher capital increases supply in markets where banks can gain market share at the expense
of a competitor, in the competitor’s core market. Lower capital does not change credit in
these contested markets. This highlights that the allocation of capital shocks is motivated
by incentives of competition and can insulate some markets from negative supply shocks.
This is also the case for the bank’s own core markets, which experience increased supply
when capital increases but remain unaffected during capital decreases. The evidence shows
that low-share markets are generally more sensitive to bank capital shocks. Importantly,
the affected small-share markets during positive and negative capital shocks are not the
same. Expansions in lending occur in competitive and contested markets; during contractions
lending decreases mostly in competitive markets. In the extensions section, I show that the
observed credit variations cannot be explained by the bank’s incentive to geographically
diversify the distribution of its portfolio. I also show that originations at the branch level
closely follow those at the level of the tract.
7 Tract Credit and Real Activity
The evidence so far shows that capital allocation depends on the existing market share.
Positive supply shocks are more significant at below-average-share markets. As a result, a
20
tract with exposed banks may be affected less if these have a higher share, or more with low-
share banks. Furthermore, higher share banks are more important for concentrated markets,
where they are more likely to expand if competitors are relatively far. I identify the supply
effects on tract credit and activity by separating exposure to small banks according to their
share. In the robustness, I also examine the role of changes in local competition.23
This section compares outcomes at different census tracts. To highlight any structural
differences between tracts based on exposure to supply shocks, Table 4 reports summary
statistics about lending competition and industrial structure. Tracts exposed to both shocks
tend to be slightly more competitive and have higher originations, particularly in the case of
residential booms. The comparison makes it clear that the empirical model needs to control
for tract heterogeneity and exclude those directly impacted by booms or fracking.
Total Market Credit: The empirical model of total tract lending allows for different
effect of exposure for banks with above- and below-average loan shares. I distinguish between
total lending by bank size and examine how it is affected by tract exposure to each bank
size. I estimate the following model, excluding tracts with direct fracking or booms impact:
Ym,b,t = α
bTractExpLm,b,t + β
bTractExpHm,b,t + γ
bTractExpLm,b,tTractExp
H
m,b,t
+φm,b + ηcounty,b,t + ǫm,b,t
(8)
Ym,b,t is log lending/total loans in tract m by all banks of size b. TractExp
L
m,b,t/TractExp
H
m,b,t
is the tract average of bank exposure for blow-/above-average share institutions, weighted
by each bank’s loan share. φm,b is a tract-bank-size fixed effect and controls for permanent
tract differences in total credit by small or big banks. ηcounty,b,t is a county-bank-size by year
effect, allowing for county annual shocks for each bank size. The effects of tract exposure
varies by bank size b and I focus on the estimates for small banks, indexed by s. I allow for
an interaction effect between low- and high-share exposure because the individual lending
23Decreases in concentration, holding tract exposure constant, indicate credit expansion by a set of small-
share banks. The bigger the set of expanding, low-share banks, the more concentration will decrease.
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estimates show that banks expand in their core markets and in other banks’ core markets.
The interaction term captures how total lending responds when this occurs in the same tract.
αs, βs, and γs can also vary depending on how competitive a census tract is. I divide the
HHI distribution into top, middle, and bottom, based on the the 33rd and 66th percentiles.
In the case of fracking, both total lending and number of loans increase with tract expo-
sure, and the importance of market share changes with concentration. Column (1) of Table 5
indicates that exposure to banks with blow- and above-average market share increases credit
by 2.6% in each case, for one standard deviation increase. Column (2) shows that the loan
count at the average tract is not affected by either. Columns (3) and (4) examine differences
by market concentration. Total credit in the top/middle HHI markets increases with the
presence of both low- and high-share banks, as evidenced by the significant positive effect
of the interaction term. The fact that the high-share effect is marginally significant by itself
also suggests that tract credit increases more with above-average-share bank exposure. One
standard deviation increase in the interaction term of 0.46 increases credit in the top HHI
markets by 67% and raises credit by 14% in the middle HHI markets. In the bottom HHI
markets, exposure to small-share banks leads to higher credit: one standard deviation leads
to 5.4% more credit. Column (4) shows that the loan count increases in a similar fashion
with lower magnitude in more competitive markets, indicating higher average loan size.
How consistent are these results with the individual bank reallocation? Banks expand
in low-share tracts where they have lower information advantage, or in higher-share markets
if these are closer to own branches and far from competitors. The average results show
that credit increases with exposure to each. In more concentrated markets, credit does
not change only with exposure to high-share banks. Instead, having both low and high-
share banks leads to higher lending. This is consistent with the branch results and suggests
that tracts part of the core market of an exposed bank see increased originations when a
small-share exposed bank tries to expand its share, using its improved financial position
to overcame its information disadvantage. In the absence of a small-share lender or in the
22
case when the tract is exposed only to a small-share lender, credit does not change. In
the first case, the high-share lender is not challenged and in the second, the small-share
lender likely poaches clients from the incumbent. The results suggest that significant tract
credit increases occur when an incumbent, with improved liquidity, strategically increases
originations to maintain market share as a low-share bank contests the market. Higher
small-share exposure in competitive markets indicates that there is a bigger set of exposed
lenders which are close to competitors, leading to higher tract credit.
The results in the case of residential booms show that credit deteriorates with tract
exposure. In more concentrated markets, this follows exposure to high-share lenders, while
in more competitive ones it is due to low-share lenders. Column (5) indicates that total credit
decreases with exposure to both lender types: one standard deviation increase in exposure
of 0.06/0.028 decreases credit by 2.9%/2.6% due to low-/high-share exposure. The average
loan count is not affected in column (6), suggesting that the deterioration in credit results
in smaller loan size. Column (7) separates the effect of exposure by market concentration.
The reductions in credit in the top HHI markets (3.7%) are due to high-share lenders, while
those in competitive ones result from exposure to low-share lenders (4.2%). In the mid-HHI
markets, both lead to decreases in tract credit: one standard deviation increase in exposure
to low-/high-share lenders decreases credit by 2.5%/3.5%. Column (8) shows that the loan
count is not affect, suggesting that credit contractions are driven by lower credit lines.
Individual banks contract in competitive and in more concentrated markets where com-
petitors are closer. In the former, this occurs where banks have smaller shares, while in the
latter the share is not important. The tract-level results are in line with this pattern since
competitive markets experience biggest contractions. Contractions are also relatively sub-
stantial in concentrated markets and are driven by high-share banks. Total number of loans
is not affected, indicating that businesses are not receiving less loans but smaller amounts.
Compared to fracking, there is no evidence that credit is affected only when both small-
and high-share lenders are exposed. This implies that contractions are not strategic and
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primarily entail the scaling back of lending amounts and not completely eliminating lending
to clients. The evidence cannot rule out that businesses are not substituting credit across
banks albeit with a reduced overall credit amounts.
The results emphasize that expansions by small-share lenders improve overall credit con-
ditions when a bigger set of exposed banks lend in concentrated markets. The estimates
related to contractions highlight that small-share lenders generate more pronounced credit
reductions in competitive markets and high-share lenders mostly impact concentrated mar-
kets. In each case only the amount of the average credit line is affected, suggesting that local
lenders continue to lend to the same number of businesses.
Real Activity: I examine the effect on real activity using the number of business
establishments by two-digit industry code in each tract from the County Business Patterns.
Since lending by small banks is unlikely to affect bigger businesses, I focus on those with
less than 50 employees and designate them as small establishments. I estimate the following
model excluding tracts with direct impact from fracking or booms:
Yind,e,m,t = α
eTractExpS,Lm,t + β
eTractExpS,Hm,t + γ
eTractExpS,Lm,tTractExp
S,H
m,t
+
∑
ind
σindEstShareind,e,m,t + φind,e,m + ηcounty,t + ǫind,e,m,t
(9)
Yind,e,m,t is log of total establishments in a tract m of industry ind and size e (relative to
50 employees). The establishments count is as of the end of year t.24 TractExpS,Lm,t and
TractExpS,Hm,t are tract exposure to small banks with below-/above-average market shares.
φind,e,m controls for permanent tract differences in the number of establishments, by size
and industry. EstShareind,e,m,t is the share of establishment of industry ind, size e, in
tract m. The set of industry shares controls for the growth potential for each industry. I
estimate a variation of this model by replacing TractExpS,Lm,t/TractExp
S,H
m,t with interactions
of each with I(Far Compete) and I(Close Compete), which represent average tract exposure
24The Census reports establishment count as of the end of the first quarter each year. I have assigned to
Yk,m,t the number of establishments as of t+ 1 which is assumed to represent the end-fo-t numbers.
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to small-share lenders in markets far/close to other competitors.25 This allows to further
investigate if activity is more sensitive when small-share lenders expand in markets close to
competitors. In all cases, the exposure effects vary by establishment size and I report those
for small businesses.
In the case of fracking, Table 6 shows that small businesses are positively impacted
by credit supply expansions by both small- and high-share lenders. According to column
(1), one standard deviation increase in small-/high-share exposure of 0.92/1.04 leads to
1.1%/0.5% increase in small establishments. The negative interaction term suggests that
the effects of exposure are higher when a tract has only small- or high-share exposed lenders
and implies that when both are present firms may substitute credit. Columns (2) shows that
expansions by high-share lenders increase real activity in the top HHI markets: one standard
deviation increase leads to 1% increase in small establishments. The effect of small-share
lenders in these markets is positive but only marginally significant. Small-share lenders have
a significant impact on activity in the middle/bottom HHI markets: one standard deviation
increase leads to 0.8%/1.2% increase in establishments. In column (3), I further examine
if small-share lenders affect activity in markets close or far from competitors, for the mid
HHI markets.26 They increase activity in concentrated markets where borrowers are close
to other competitors by 1.2% – as much as in competitive markets.
The evidence suggests that real activity is positively affected by supply shocks. Tract
results are consistent with the individual allocation of bank capital. We see that activity
increases in the top HHI markets with exposure to high-share lenders and marginally so to
small-share ones. Bank evidence shows that high-share lenders in these markets expand in
markets close to own branches. Tract evidence shows that this increase is related to the
presence of exposed small-share lenders which contest markets where they lack information
advantage. Together, the results suggest that in top HHI markets, total credit increases when
25I use 0.90 as a cutoff for the index of distance to competitors to define far and close.
26In the rest of the markets the interaction of market share and market concentration suggests that the
high-share impact is in markets far from competitors and low-share one is close to competitors. I also
estimate but do not report the full model and confirm that this is the case.
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a bigger set of local banks are exposed but real activity is primarily affected by the expansion
by high-share lenders. A similar outcome occurs in the mid HHI markets in terms of total
credit. In this case, low-share lenders have a bigger impact on real activity by successfully
challenging incumbents and expanding close to competitors. In competitive markets, both
credit and activity is driven by exposure to small-share lenders.
The evidence in the case of residential booms in Table 6, indicates that credit reductions
have a limited impact on real activity. The effect of average exposure in column (4) has a
positive sign, implying that tracts experience an increase in activity during the reduction in
total credit. When coefficients are allowed to vary by the HHI level, the effect of small-share
exposure is positive and significant in the top/mid HHI markets, while this is the case for
high-share exposure in the bottom HHI markets.
The results from individual bank responses and tract credit show that bigger-share lenders
reduce credit more significantly in concentrated markets. One way to interpret the results
here is to compare the change in activity across tracts with more small-share exposed lenders
to tracts with more high-share exposed lenders. Since the former do not reduce credit
significantly we can use them to quantify the relative impact on activity. This assumes that
tracts which are not exposed at all are qualitatively different. By this measure, tracts, in
concentrated markets, exposed to bigger decreases in credit by big-share lenders grow slower.
Instead, when comparing to other, unexposed tract, reductions in credit do not affect real
activity. This suggests that businesses find alternative sources of credit. It is also likely,
and supported by the evidence, that banks just reduce credit lines but still lend to new
businesses.
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8 Robustness and Extensions
Geographic Portfolio Diversification
The reallocation of capital that follows bank exposure to each shock can be due to the
bank incentive to geographically diversify the distribution of small business loans. This
is an alternative interpretation of the results in the main section which deemphasizes the
importance of relative local return. According to this hypothesis banks expand or contract
credit in order to improve their geographic footprint and minimize exposure to local economic
shocks. I explore this by calculating the GINI coefficient for the geographic distribution of the
lending portfolio and examine whether it decreases after exposure to each shock. The results
are listed in Table 7. The effect of exposure is only significant for banks with relatively
diversified lending and implies that banks become less diversified after expansions due to
fracking (column 1). In the case of booms, the effect of exposure is positive and significant
only for more geographically concentrated lenders. It implies that such banks become even
less diversified after their reductions in credit. Both results suggest that exposed banks do not
reallocate capital in order to diversify geographically. In both cases banks are less diversified
after the capital shocks. This shows that geographic concentration and reallocations based
on relative return are not consistent with each other.
Branch vs Branch-tract lending
The main results are based on lending at the level of the tract of the borrower. In this part,
I aggregate all originations by each distinct branch and examine the effect of bank exposure
on total branch lending. Instead of a branch-tract by year fixed effect I control for town by
year effects based on the town of each branch. Comparison between estimates at the level of
the branch and the branch-tract help identify the extent to which branches of exposed banks
tend to lend in different tracts compared to unexposed ones. The results are listed in Table
7. Column (2) is the main supply effect at the branch level and column (3) is the effect from
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the main results in the case of fracking. The estimates suggest that exposed banks tend to
lend in tracts with permanently higher originations. Comparing columns (7) and (8), in the
case of residential booms, we see that estimates are close and there is no evidence of such
permanent differences in tract originations.
Market Share and Industrial Composition
The main results show that lending at low-share markets is more sensitive to bank capital
shocks. In this section, I investigate which industries are more likely to be affected by
this sensitivity. I extend the baseline tract-branch lending model by interacting the effect of
market share with the tract share of industries for establishments with less than 50 employees.
The results are listed in Table 7.27 In the case of fracking, banks expand in small-share
tracts when they have above-average concentration in manufacturing. The share appears to
matter less for tract with higher share of administrative and support services. The higher
share of manufacturing implies that further expansion by small-share lenders can increase
profitability and helps support the interpretation that banks expand in markets with higher
return. It also suggests that manufacturing establishments are more likely to be impacted
by the credit supply shocks. In the case of residential booms, we see that banks contract
more in low-share markets with higher concentration of construction, wholesale, retail, and
health care. Banks reduce credit in markets outside of booms in order to increase originations
within booming areas where residential prices are appreciating and construction is profitable.
The fact that they reduce more in tracts with higher share in construction suggest that they
minimize their exposure to construction industries outside of the booming markets.
Supply Shocks and Changes in Competition
An alternative approach for identifying where different-share lenders expand or contract
credit keeps track of average exposure and changes in concentration. Decreases in concen-
27I interact the shares of all industries over 3% but do not report the estimates for non-significant ones
tration, holding tract exposure constant, indicate credit expansion by a set of small-share
banks. Conversely, the bigger the set of expanding, low-share banks, the more concentration
will decrease. I compute average tract exposure and use changes in the HHI after tract
exposure. In the case of total credit, I estimate the following model in several versions:
Ym,b,t = α
bTractExpm,b,t + β
bTractExpm,b,t△InvHHIm,t
+γb△InvHHIm,t + φm,b + ηcounty,b,t + ǫm,b,t
(10)
Ym,b,t is log lending/total loans in tract m by all banks of size b. TractExpm,b,t is the tract
m loan-share weighted average of bank exposure. △InvHHIm,t is the change in the inverse
HHI at tract m, where a value of 1 stands for a perfectly competitive market. Positive
△InvHHIm,t indicates an increase in competition. α
s, βs, and γs can vary HHI. When
interacted with the HHI category, βs captures the impact of change in competition which
moves the tract’s concentration to the bottom, middle, or top of the HHI distribution. It
identifies supply shocks in tracts where competitors are not able to maintain share.
I estimate the effect on real activity allowing for supply-driven changes in concentration:
Yind,e,m,t = α
eTractExpsm,t + β
eTractExpsm,t△InvHHIm,t
+γe△InvHHIm,t + φind,e,m + ηcounty,t + ǫind,e,m,t
(11)
Yind,e,m,t is log of total establishments in a tract m of industry ind and size e. Variables
are defined as in the credit model. The variation in number of establishments of different
size by industry for each tract allows me to replace the county-level shocks with tract-year
fixed effects. In this case, I cannot estimate separate effects for small/big establishments but
can identify if smaller ones change relative to big ones. The benefit of this approach is that
the tract-year fixed effect controls for common shocks at the tract level such as variations in
the tract concentration, which can results from tract-level demand shocks.
Tract Credit: With fracking, Table 8 shows that both total lending and number of
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loans increase with exposure. One deviation increase of 2.2 wells raises total small-bank
credit/count by 6%/1.7%. The effect of change in concentration is not significant in either
case. Lending increases in competitive markets: 8.3% more credit for one deviation increase
in exposure, independent of concentration change. Decrease in concentration explains in-
creases in number of loans: one deviation higher competition of 5% increases loan count by
2.6% with 2.2 wells exposure. This shows that the credit increase in concentrated markets
from the main results is not driven by changes in concentration. It implies that both types of
lenders need to be present in order to see increases in tract credit. This further confirms that
improvement of credit results from small-share lenders contesting markets where big-share
lenders also experience increased liquidity.
Credit deteriorates with tract exposure to residential booms. Column (5) indicates one
deviation increase in exposure of 0.10 decreases lending by 5.7% and 5% increase in com-
petition decreases lending by 11%. Total loans in column (6), are negatively affected only
with increases in competition. For top HHI markets, higher competition leads to decreases
in credit and number of loans. A 5% higher competition there decreases total credit/loan
count by 16%/6.4%. This suggests that the decrease in credit due to contraction by big-share
lenders in the main results can be partially attributed to reductions in concentration. There
are no interactions between exposure by banks of different share, as with fracking.
Real Activity: Table 6 shows that small businesses are positively impacted by credit
supply expansions. In column (1), one deviation increase in exposure of 2.2 wells leads to
1.8% increase in small establishments. Concentration is not significant in the baseline case.
When coefficients vary HHI, the effect is significant for tracts with lower concentration,
both with a county/tract-level demand controls. A 5% reduction in concentration leads to
a 0.3%/0.4% increase in small establishments. The positive effect is in addition of that of
average exposure. Column (2) shows that exposure has a positive effect in all markets, while
in column (3) it is significant in concentrated ones. Relative to the main results, the evidence
here shows that increases in activity in concentrated markets do not occur with changes in
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concentration. Instead, both small- and big-share lenders increase credit, preserving their
shares. At the same time, increases by big-share lenders drive activity in the top HHI
markets, while small-share lenders are critical for activity in the mid/bottom HHI markets.
The evidence in the case of residential booms indicates that credit reductions have a
limited impact on real activity. The effect of average exposure in column (4) has a positive
sign, implying that tracts experience an increase in activity during the reduction in total
credit. When coefficients vary with the HHI level, the effect of exposure is only marginally
significant and positive. In more competitive markets, the effect of change in concentration is
positive and significant. It implies that reductions in real activity occur only in cases when
competition is reduced. This is consistent with the main results, which showed that, in
competitive markets, activity is lower with higher exposure to small-share lenders compared
to exposure to high-share ones. The estimates here suggest that the exist of small-share
lenders reduces competition and can decrease activity.
9 Conclusion
This paper uses two of the well-documented local shocks, studied by this literature, and
shows that the existing evidence regarding credit effects holds in the case of small business
lending. I go beyond the average effect, documented in the existing studies, and show that
banks reallocate capital in a strategic fashion. Credit is expanded by banks that overcome
lower quality of information at distance, taking advantage of higher liquidity/lower deposit
expense. They target low-share markets with higher marginal return to capital. Contractions
occur in reverse – banks reduce where a higher share results in lower marginal return, and
where information quality is lower. This emphasizes the interaction between the bank’s
ability to acquire soft information at a distance and its financial position. I show that
supply shocks have asymmetric effects on activity due to the strategic fashion of capital
allocation. Positive shocks not only increase supply across the network but also raise total
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market credit and activity. The results highlight a different aspect of the lending channel
– credit supply shocks have real effects in markets where lenders have lower historic loan
shares and use their improved financial position to offset lower market power.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Banks by Exposure
Fracking Wells Residential Booms
Small Banks Big Banks All Small Banks Big Banks All
Expi,t=0 Expi,t > 0 Expi,t=0 Expi,t > 0 Expi,t=0 Expi,t > 0 Expi,t=0 Expi,t > 0
Expi,t 0 1.214 0 7.366 0.451 0 0.491 0 0.144 0.0747
(0) (4.362) (0) (23.36) (5.647) (0) (0.380) (0) (0.208) (0.219)
Log Deposits 12.98 13.09 15.02 15.64 13.44 12.93 13.19 14.74 15.60 13.42
(0.931) (0.906) (1.060) (1.613) (1.337) (0.912) (0.778) (0.936) (1.348) (1.320)
Interest Expense (%) 3.241 2.759 3.117 3.210 3.191 7.297 5.071 3.495 3.570 6.248
(1.811) (1.481) (1.937) (2.319) (1.847) (144.1) (54.07) (2.668) (2.201) (119.6)
Yield on Assets (%) 6.582 6.605 6.165 6.099 6.494 6.666 6.758 6.446 6.374 6.624
(1.650) (1.403) (1.332) (1.336) (1.586) (1.514) (1.644) (1.231) (1.277) (1.485)
Net Interest Margin (%) 3.966 4.240 3.812 3.811 3.950 4.032 4.110 3.874 3.804 4.002
(1.276) (0.980) (0.838) (0.803) (1.185) (1.178) (1.321) (0.845) (0.836) (1.139)
Log Assets 13.16 13.21 15.24 15.91 13.62 13.13 13.38 14.95 15.86 13.63
(0.987) (0.948) (1.166) (1.768) (1.407) (0.927) (0.844) (1.073) (1.479) (1.368)
Deposits over Assets 0.788 0.823 0.744 0.731 0.780 0.787 0.775 0.745 0.721 0.774
(0.105) (0.0928) (0.104) (0.107) (0.107) (0.120) (0.110) (0.113) (0.106) (0.119)
Capital over Assets (%) 9.837 9.199 9.482 9.613 9.733 9.647 9.447 9.158 9.077 9.513
(4.144) (2.958) (2.615) (2.733) (3.823) (3.704) (4.073) (2.328) (2.411) (3.527)
Securities over Assets 0.224 0.251 0.209 0.200 0.222 0.233 0.227 0.228 0.208 0.230
(0.138) (0.167) (0.110) (0.105) (0.135) (0.147) (0.131) (0.114) (0.105) (0.139)
Mortgages over Assets 0.346 0.302 0.374 0.323 0.346 0.345 0.357 0.377 0.374 0.353
(0.186) (0.189) (0.180) (0.163) (0.185) (0.189) (0.181) (0.187) (0.178) (0.187)
Business Loans over Assets 0.322 0.340 0.308 0.340 0.322 0.318 0.320 0.298 0.297 0.314
(0.175) (0.195) (0.149) (0.148) (0.172) (0.180) (0.161) (0.143) (0.143) (0.171)
Net Operating Income over Assets (%) 1.010 1.169 0.932 0.966 1.005 1.177 1.134 1.155 1.179 1.170
(1.136) (0.817) (1.080) (1.118) (1.111) (1.020) (0.649) (0.600) (0.563) (0.905)
Unused Commitments over Assets 0.245 0.142 0.214 0.215 0.232 0.219 0.242 0.204 0.238 0.222
(2.083) (0.133) (0.226) (0.141) (1.788) (1.122) (1.300) (0.206) (0.235) (1.030)
Part of Holding Company 0.369 0.419 0.433 0.538 0.391 0.399 0.322 0.423 0.545 0.407
(0.483) (0.494) (0.496) (0.499) (0.488) (0.490) (0.467) (0.494) (0.498) (0.491)
Single Bank Entity 0.412 0.462 0.399 0.342 0.409 0.391 0.437 0.395 0.291 0.387
(0.492) (0.499) (0.490) (0.475) (0.492) (0.488) (0.496) (0.489) (0.455) (0.487)
Notes: The table reports average values and standard deviations for balance sheet and income variables of banks divided by their exposure to fracking or
residential booms and their size. Small banks have less than 30 branches.
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Table 2: Deposit and Profitability Impact of Local Exposure
Exposure: Fracking Wells Exposure: Residential Booms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Branch Branch Bank Interest Yield on Net Interest Yield on Net Interest
Deposits Deposits Deposits Expense Assets Margin Assets Margin
ExpS 0.0240*** 0.00138** -0.00591*** 0.113*** 0.0956***
(0.00801) (0.000515) (0.00155) (0.0367) (0.0323)
E
xp
S
Northeast Region 0.000312 0.00978 -0.0225
(0.00903) (0.0525) (0.0323)
Midwest Region 0.247 0.176*** 0.162**
(0.208) (0.0482) (0.0637)
South Region 0.0271*** 0.0645* 0.131***
(0.00950) (0.0334) (0.0270)
West Region 0.0244** 0.327** 0.0492
(0.0119) (0.141) (0.0815)
ExpB 0.00542** 0.000160* 0.00124 -0.116 -0.207
(0.00273) (9.16e-05) (0.00226) (0.347) (0.310)
E
xp
B
Northeast Region 0.0525*** -0.510 -0.660**
(0.0188) (0.350) (0.295)
Midwest Region 0.00101*** -1.402** -1.210**
(0.000226) (0.610) (0.500)
South Region 0.0106*** 0.223 0.248
(0.00169) (0.224) (0.183)
West Region 0.0147** 1.393 0.517
(0.00583) (0.936) (0.708)
Observations 554,714 554,714 14,729 14,416 5,874 5,874 5,874 5,874
R-squared 0.935 0.935 0.985 0.883 0.921 0.902 0.922 0.902
Branch FE Yes Yes
Metro x Year FE Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Branch Branch Bank, State Bank, State Bank, State Bank, State Bank, State Bank, State
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (1) and (2) are based on branch-level regressions using branch deposits. ExpS/ExpB in
this case is the weighted total of new fracking wells in the proximity. Columns (3)-(8) are based on bank-level regressions. ExpS/ExpB
in this case is the bank-level exposure to each local shock: total new wells or fraction of branches in residential booms. North-
east/Midwest/South/West are indicators for each of the four Census regions. Interest expense is total cost of funding assets divided
by all deposits. Fracking sample covers the period from 2000 to 2010. Residential booms sample covers the period from 2000 to 2005. In-
terest expense, yield on assets and net interest margin are in %. Controls included in the estimation but not reported include: ln Assetst−1,
Deposits/Assetst−1, Securities/Assetst−1, C&I/Assetst−1, Mortgages/Assetst−1, Unused Loan Commitments/Assetst−1, △ TotalBranches
× Small Bank, △ TotalBranches × Big Bank, △I(Small Bank). Each of the controls is the last quarterly value from the previous year.
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Table 3: Bank-level Credit Supply Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Exposure: Fracking Wells Exposure: Residential Booms
Branch-Tract Loans Branch-Tract Loans
ExpS 0.0217** 0.0237*** 0.438** 0.146 -0.137 0.909 -0.553*** -0.549*** -3.257* -2.640 6.543 -8.139**
(0.00848) (0.00675) (0.191) (0.178) (0.388) (0.621) (0.0897) (0.0908) (1.888) (1.927) (5.189) (3.227)
ExpS × RelativeLoanSht−1 -0.120*** -0.112*** -0.172** -0.0894 1.243** 1.139** 1.472 0.438
(0.0398) (0.0413) (0.0755) (0.0581) (0.492) (0.494) (3.215) (0.571)
ExpS × RemoteCompete -0.496** -0.185 0.200 -1.076 3.794** 3.245* 0.827 7.443**
(0.197) (0.182) (0.425) (0.701) (1.918) (1.946) (5.840) (3.290)
ExpS × CloseToLender 0.0344 0.0490 -0.0117 0.0980** -0.755 -0.897 -9.257** 0.925
(0.0441) (0.0455) (0.0724) (0.0468) (0.677) (0.698) (4.657) (0.884)
Observations 1,252,884 1,252,884 1,252,878 1,252,878 788,673 416,225 660,439 660,439 660,429 660,429 390,103 209,005
Within R2 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.0535 0.315 0.0681 0.0694 0.0681 0.0694 0.0175 0.125
Sample
Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Close to Far from Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Close to Far from
Fracking Fracking Fracking Fracking Competitors Competitors RE Booms RE Booms RE Booms RE Booms Competitors Competitors
Branch x Borrower’s Census Tract FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower’s Census Tract x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.The results are based on tract-level lending for each branch. All regressions exclude branches and tracts which are directly affected by the local shocks. ExpS is the
effect of exposure for banks with less than 30 branches. RelativeLoanSh is defined as the average small business loans share in the census tract over the previous two years scaled so that 0 is the average share
for the bank across all tracts. A positive RelativeLoanSh reflects above bank-average share, while a negative RelativeLoanSh is below bank-average share. CloseToLender = (1/(1+BorrowerDistance))
and RemoteCompete = 1−(1/(1+DistanceToCompetitors)) are scaled distances to originating branch/distance to competition. Close to Competitors samples include tracts with RemoteCompete below
0.9/0.8 for fracking/residential booms. Far from Competitors samples includes tract not in the Close to Competitors samples. Errors clustered at the branch level. All regressions include controls for
bigger banks which are not reported. Controls included in the estimation but not reported include: ln Assetst−1, Deposits/Assetst−1, Securities/Assetst−1, C&I/Assetst−1, Mortgages/Assetst−1, Unused
Loan Commitments/Assetst−1, △ TotalBranches × Small Bank, △ TotalBranches × Big Bank, △I(Small Bank). Each of the controls is the quarterly average from the previous year.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for Census Tracts by Exposure to Small Banks
Fracking Wells Residential Booms
Small Banks All Small Banks All
TractExp = 0 TractExp > 0 TractExp = 0 TractExp > 0
TractExp 0 0.371 0.0124 0 0.0183 0.00193
(0) (1.383) (0.261) (0) (0.0622) (0.0210)
TractExpL 0 0.181 0.00605 0 0.0139 0.00147
(0) (0.921) (0.172) (0) (0.0566) (0.0189)
TractExpH 0 0.190 0.00633 0 0.00440 0.000465
(0) (1.041) (0.193) (0) (0.0276) (0.00907)
TractExpL× TractExpH 0 0.0242 0.000807 0 0.00000864 0.000000913
(0) (0.460) (0.0842) (0) (0.000185) (0.0000602)
Total Lending ($ K) 2297.1 2999.0 2320.6 2110.5 4443.3 2356.9
(2871.8) (2869.0) (2874.4) (2886.8) (4197.3) (3134.9)
(HHI ≤ 33rd) 0.337 0.464 0.342 0.293 0.353 0.300
(0.473) (0.499) (0.474) (0.455) (0.478) (0.458)
(33rd < HHI ≤ 66th) 0.337 0.248 0.334 0.334 0.369 0.338
(0.473) (0.432) (0.472) (0.472) (0.483) (0.473)
(66th < HHI) 0.326 0.288 0.324 0.373 0.278 0.363
(0.469) (0.453) (0.468) (0.484) (0.448) (0.481)
Total Establishments 171.7 217.5 173.2 152.1 184.8 155.6
(163.9) (255.6) (168.0) (151.4) (158.9) (152.5)
Share Small Establishments 0.951 0.951 0.951 0.949 0.946 0.949
(0.0237) (0.0206) (0.0236) (0.0250) (0.0234) (0.0248)
Share in Construction 0.100 0.0924 0.0999 0.103 0.110 0.104
(0.0563) (0.0543) (0.0563) (0.0569) (0.0590) (0.0571)
Share in Manufacturing 0.0337 0.0343 0.0338 0.0402 0.0409 0.0403
(0.0226) (0.0217) (0.0225) (0.0265) (0.0259) (0.0264)
Share in Wholesale 0.0488 0.0513 0.0489 0.0507 0.0505 0.0507
(0.0299) (0.0288) (0.0298) (0.0295) (0.0255) (0.0291)
Share in Retail 0.162 0.150 0.162 0.160 0.154 0.160
(0.0498) (0.0487) (0.0498) (0.0494) (0.0461) (0.0491)
Share in Transportation/Warehousing 0.0311 0.0273 0.0310 0.0323 0.0300 0.0320
(0.0260) (0.0254) (0.0260) (0.0258) (0.0231) (0.0256)
Share in Information 0.0143 0.0173 0.0144 0.0145 0.0145 0.0145
(0.00988) (0.00959) (0.00989) (0.0100) (0.00779) (0.00980)
Share in Finance 0.0607 0.0673 0.0610 0.0594 0.0609 0.0596
(0.0237) (0.0248) (0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0245) (0.0238)
Share in Real Estate 0.0442 0.0476 0.0444 0.0412 0.0401 0.0411
(0.0185) (0.0176) (0.0185) (0.0187) (0.0163) (0.0185)
Share in Professional Services 0.0917 0.105 0.0921 0.0841 0.0883 0.0845
(0.0536) (0.0616) (0.0539) (0.0503) (0.0469) (0.0500)
Share in Admin Support/Waste Man 0.0435 0.0424 0.0434 0.0410 0.0432 0.0412
(0.0199) (0.0167) (0.0198) (0.0178) (0.0162) (0.0177)
Share in Healthcare 0.0957 0.101 0.0959 0.0926 0.0902 0.0923
(0.0448) (0.0478) (0.0449) (0.0435) (0.0428) (0.0434)
Share in Accommodation/Food 0.0737 0.0748 0.0737 0.0751 0.0742 0.0750
(0.0268) (0.0251) (0.0267) (0.0268) (0.0262) (0.0267)
Share in Other Services 0.107 0.0966 0.107 0.112 0.108 0.112
(0.0309) (0.0281) (0.0309) (0.0311) (0.0280) (0.0308)
Notes: The table reports average values and standard deviations for exposure, competition, and industry-composition variables
for census tracts. Tracts are divided by exposure.
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Table 5: Tract Exposure and Total Credit
Tract Exposure Fracking Banks Tract Exposure Residential Boom Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Number Total Number Total Number Total Number
Credit of Loans Credit of Loans Credit of Loans Credit of Loans
TractExpS,L 0.0282** 0.00811 -0.489*** -0.0400
(0.0126) (0.00757) (0.164) (0.0826)
TractExpS,H 0.0248*** 0.00382 -0.925*** -0.163
(0.00934) (0.00452) (0.330) (0.139)
TractExpS,L × TractExpS,H 0.00776 -0.00878 -1.129 -9.936
(0.0135) (0.00838) (17.05) (14.35)
(6
6t
h
<
H
H
I t
) TractExpS,L -0.0394 -0.0220 -0.424* 0.0199
(0.0242) (0.0142) (0.253) (0.120)
TractExpS,H 0.0279* 0.00586 -1.318** -0.273
(0.0166) (0.00655) (0.512) (0.241)
TractExpS,L × TractExpS,H 1.460*** 1.496*** -4.341 -18.80
(0.441) (0.322) (22.12) (22.38)
(3
3r
d
<
H
H
I t
≤
66
th
)
TractExpS,L 0.00240 0.00320 -0.412** -0.0627
(0.0299) (0.0158) (0.203) (0.114)
TractExpS,H 0.0159* -0.00148 -1.236*** -0.157
(0.00940) (0.00467) (0.460) (0.187)
TractExpS,L × TractExpS,H 0.298*** 0.201** 4.874 -2.395
(0.0844) (0.0880) (27.56) (12.35)
(H
H
I t
≤
33
r
d
) TractExpS,L 0.0586*** 0.0184** -0.716*** -0.109
(0.0120) (0.00919) (0.224) (0.103)
TractExpS,H 0.0191* -0.00344 0.0186 -0.0379
(0.0114) (0.00575) (0.425) (0.145)
TractExpS,L × TractExpS,H -0.0186 -0.0215*** 28.07 39.17
(0.0113) (0.00719) (54.06) (36.91)
Observations 368,173 368,173 368,173 368,173 305,346 305,346 305,346 305,346
R-squared 0.878 0.928 0.878 0.928 0.875 0.906 0.876 0.906
Census Tract x Bank Size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County x Bank Size x Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Tract Tract Tract Tract Tract Tract Tract Tract
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are based on tract level information for total credit from small and big
banks. Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) use the total amount of small business loans. The rest of the estimates are based on
the total number of loans. TractExpS,L/TractExpS,H is the tract loan-weighted average exposure to small lenders with blow-
average/above-average lagged market shares. I(66th < HHIt), I(33
rd < HHIt ≤ 66
th), and I(33rd < HHIt ≤ 66
th) are indicators
for the relative competitiveness of the market based on the 33rd and 66th percentiles. All regressions include but do not report
controls for exposure to big lenders.
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Table 6: Tract Exposure and Economic Activity
Tract Exposure Fracking Banks Tract Exposure Boom Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of Establishments Number of Establishments
TractExpS,L 0.0117*** 0.0458***
(0.00196) (0.0165)
TractExpS,H 0.00525*** 0.0497
(0.00168) (0.0342)
TractExpS,L × TractExpS,H -0.00478** 1.758
(0.00199) (4.548)
(6
6t
h
<
H
H
I t
) TractExpS,L 0.0119* 0.0120* 0.0522**
(0.00670) (0.00670) (0.0236)
TractExpS,H 0.00970*** 0.00969*** -0.0128
(0.00343) (0.00343) (0.0405)
TractExpS,L × TractExpS,H 0.153* 0.152* 11.18**
(0.0902) (0.0902) (5.406)
(3
3r
d
<
H
H
I t
≤
66
th
)
TractExpS,L 0.00883*** 0.0405**
(0.00320) (0.0206)
TractExpS,L × I(Far Compete) 0.00747*
(0.00404)
TractExpS,L × I(Close Compete) 0.0128***
(0.00181)
TractExpS,H 0.00325* 0.0277
(0.00174) (0.0397)
TractExpS,H × I(Far Compete) 0.00351*
(0.00183)
TractExpS,H × I(Close Compete) -0.000613
(0.00324)
TractExpS,L × TractExpS,H -0.00176 -8.415
(0.00757) (5.717)
(H
H
I t
≤
33
r
d
) TractExpS,L 0.0128*** 0.0129*** 0.0472
(0.00198) (0.00198) (0.0297)
TractExpS,H 0.00361 0.00364 0.174**
(0.00240) (0.00240) (0.0864)
TractExpS,L × TractExpS,H -0.00530*** -0.00530*** -12.37
(0.00186) (0.00186) (10.85)
Observations 6,441,597 6,441,597 6,441,597 5,478,556 5,478,556
Within R2 0.00366 0.00366 0.00366 0.00292 0.00292
Census Tract x Industry x Size FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Tract Tract Tract Tract Tract
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are based on the number of establishments by in-
dustry/size in each census tract. The table lists coefficient estimates for the case of small establish-
ments. TractExpS,L/TractExpS,H is the tract loan-weighted average exposure to small lenders with blow-
average/above-average lagged market shares.. I(66th < HHIt), I(33
rd < HHIt ≤ 66
th), and I(33rd < HHIt ≤
66th) are indicators for the relative competitiveness of the market based on the 33rd and 66th percentiles. All
regressions include but do not report effect on big establishments, controls for exposure to big lenders and the
△InvHHI effect for each bank size.
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Table 7: Robustness: Bank-level Credit Supply Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Exposure: Fracking Wells Exposure: Residential Booms
Concentr Branch Loans Branch-Tract Loans Concentr Branch Loans Branch-Tract Loans
ExpS × I( ¯GINI ≤ 33rd) 0.00555*** -0.00407
(0.000373) (0.0332)
ExpS × I(33rd < ¯GINI ≤ 66th) 2.29e-05 -0.00270
(0.000829) (0.0180)
ExpS × I(66th < ¯GINI) 0.000110 0.102***
(0.00166) (0.0392)
ExpS 0.0457*** 0.0217** 0.146 0.337* -0.515*** -0.553*** -2.640 -1.976
(0.0142) (0.00848) (0.178) (0.182) (0.138) (0.0897) (1.927) (2.180)
ExpS × LoanSht−1 -0.112*** -0.104*** 1.139** 1.521**
(0.0413) (0.0373) (0.494) (0.705)
ExpS × LoanSht−1 × Sh Construction -0.380 33.41*
(1.742) (18.06)
ExpS × LoanSht−1 × Sh Manufacturing -4.895** 15.37
(2.467) (27.53)
ExpS × LoanSht−1 × Sh Wholesale -2.284 53.18**
(1.558) (22.88)
ExpS × LoanSht−1 × Sh Retail 1.328 36.20*
(1.717) (20.06)
ExpS × LoanSht−1 × Sh Admin and Support 4.650* 50.66
(2.549) (32.01)
ExpS × LoanSht−1 × Sh Health Care -1.196 27.87*
(1.391) (16.87)
ExpS × RemoteCompete -0.185 -0.379** 3.245* 3.007
(0.182) (0.184) (1.946) (2.228)
ExpS × CloseToLender 0.0490 0.0364 -0.897 -1.333*
(0.0455) (0.0487) (0.698) (0.718)
Observations 3,195 345,427 1,252,884 1,252,878 1,097,636 2,779 106,990 660,439 660,429 582,376
Within R2 0.689 0.819 0.123 0.123 0.126 0.674 0.895 0.0681 0.0694 0.0670
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ExpS is the effect of exposure for banks with less than 30 branches. ¯GINI is the bank average of loan concentration for each bank
over the entire sample. LoanSh is defined as the average small business loans share in the census tract over the previous two years. CloseToLender/RemoteCompete are
scaled distance to originating branch/distance to competition as defined in the main text. Columns (1) and (6) are based on concentration of bank small business lending
portfolio, defined as the GINI coefficient of tract loan concentration. Column (2) and (6) are based on branch-level lending and include a branch fixed effect and a town-of-
branch by year fixed effect. The rest are based on branch-tract loans. Sh refers to the share of the respective industry only for establishments with less than 50 employees.
The table reports only the marginally significant shares. Controls included in the estimation but not reported include: ln Assetst−1, Deposits/Assetst−1, Securities/Assetst−1,
C&I/Assetst−1, Mortgages/Assetst−1, Unused Loan Commitments/Assetst−1, △ TotalBranches × Small Bank, △ TotalBranches × Big Bank, △I(Small Bank). Each of
the controls is the quarterly average from the previous year.
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Table 8: Robustness: Tract Exposure, Total Credit, and Competition
Tract Exposure Fracking Banks Tract Exposure Residential Boom Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Number Total Number Total Number Total Number
Credit of Loans Credit of Loans Credit of Loans Credit of Loans
TractExps 0.0268*** 0.00782* -0.568*** -0.0640
(0.00828) (0.00458) (0.147) (0.0703)
TractExps ×△InvHHI -0.0503 0.0680 -2.271** -0.913*
(0.0779) (0.0528) (1.129) (0.469)
I(66th < HHIt) × TractExp
s 0.00818 0.0124 -0.620** -0.0594
(0.0185) (0.00863) (0.247) (0.107)
I(66th < HHIt) × TractExp
s ×△InvHHI -0.0973 0.0353 -3.286** -1.385**
(0.101) (0.0601) (1.527) (0.656)
I(33rd < HHIt ≤ 66
th) ×TractExps 0.0184 0.00995 -0.652*** -0.0963
(0.0118) (0.00752) (0.191) (0.100)
I(33rd < HHIt ≤ 66
th) × TractExps ×△InvHHI -0.0167 0.133 0.466 -0.0362
(0.156) (0.0966) (2.088) (0.824)
I(HHIt ≤ 33
rd) ×TractExps 0.0376*** 0.00612 -0.522*** -0.113
(0.00908) (0.00548) (0.199) (0.0906)
I(HHIt ≤ 33
rd)× TractExps ×△InvHHI -0.241 0.240** -3.320 0.0591
(0.161) (0.117) (2.567) (0.911)
Observations 368,173 368,173 368,173 368,173 305,346 305,346 305,346 305,346
R-squared 0.878 0.928 0.878 0.928 0.875 0.906 0.876 0.906
Census Tract x Bank Size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County x Bank Size x Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Tract Tract Tract Tract Tract Tract Tract Tract
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are based on tract level information for total credit from small and big banks. Columns (1),
(3), (5), and (7) use the total amount of small business loans. The rest of the estimates are based on the total number of loans. TractExps
is the tract loan-weighted average exposure to small lenders. △InvHHI is the change in the inverse of HHI where 1 represents a perfectly
competitive market. I(66th < HHIt), I(33
rd < HHIt ≤ 66
th), and I(33rd < HHIt ≤ 66
th) are indicators for the relative competitiveness
of the market based on the 33rd and 66th percentiles. All regressions include but do not report controls for exposure to big lenders and the
△InvHHI effect for each bank size.
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Table 9: Robustness: Tract Exposure, Economic Activity, and Competition
Tract Exposure Fracking Banks Tract Exposure Boom Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of Establishments Number of Establishments
TractExps 0.00809*** 0.0475***
(0.00149) (0.0152)
TractExps ×△InvHHI -0.000796 0.168*
(0.0142) (0.0887)
I(66th < HHIt) ×TractExp
s 0.00923** 0.00867** 0.0467* 0.0798
(0.00421) (0.00407) (0.0241) (0.0504)
I(66th < HHIt) × TractExp
s ×△InvHHI -0.00970 0.0103 0.0448 0.178
(0.0205) (0.0214) (0.115) (0.227)
I(33rd < HHIt ≤ 66
th) ×TractExps 0.00571*** -0.000519 0.0262 0.0594*
(0.00204) (0.00318) (0.0205) (0.0330)
I(33rd < HHIt ≤ 66
th) ×TractExps ×△InvHHI 0.00675 -0.00751 0.294 0.0441
(0.0232) (0.0402) (0.196) (0.483)
I(HHIt ≤ 33
rd) ×TractExps 0.00916*** 0.00392* 0.0508* 0.0391
(0.00168) (0.00223) (0.0274) (0.0532)
I(HHIt ≤ 33
rd) × TractExps ×△InvHHI 0.0578** 0.0815** 0.676** 0.963
(0.0275) (0.0393) (0.295) (0.754)
Observations 6,441,597 6,441,597 6,441,597 5,478,556 5,478,556 5,478,556
R-squared 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.970 0.970 0.970
Census Tract x Industry x Size FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census Tract x Year FE Yes Yes
Cluster Tract Tract Tract Tract Tract Tract
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are based on the number of establishments by industry/size in each census
tract. The table lists coefficients for small establishments. TractExps is the tract loan-weighted average exposure to small
lenders. △InvHHI is the change in the inverse of HHI where 1 represents a perfectly competitive market. I(66th < HHIt),
I(33rd < HHIt ≤ 66
th), and I(33rd < HHIt ≤ 66
th) are indicators for the relative competitiveness of the market based on the
33rd and 66th percentiles. All regressions include but do not report effect on big establishments, controls for exposure to big
lenders and the △InvHHI effect for each bank size.
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Appendix (for online publication only)
Appendix 1: Robustness
Table A1: Profitability of Exposure to Different Residential Booms
Appreciation > 91st Appreciation > 93rd Appreciation > 95th Appreciation > 97th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Yield NIM Yield NIM Yield NIM Yield NIM
Expsi,t 0.0324 0.0538 0.0831** 0.0892*** 0.0954** 0.0910** 0.113*** 0.0956***
(0.0372) (0.0321) (0.0342) (0.0314) (0.0373) (0.0342) (0.0367) (0.0323)
Expbi,t -0.0205 0.0177 -0.0335 0.00977 -0.0991 -0.0583 -0.116 -0.207
(0.145) (0.125) (0.158) (0.154) (0.220) (0.197) (0.347) (0.310)
Observations 5,874 5,874 5,874 5,874 5,874 5,874 5,874 5,874
R-squared 0.921 0.902 0.921 0.902 0.921 0.902 0.921 0.902
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Bank, State Bank, State Bank, State Bank, State Bank, State Bank, State Bank, State Bank, State
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.Expsi,t/Exp
b
i,t is the weighted fraction of branches in residential booms defined as the
corresponding percentile of residential appreciation. Yield is the return on earning assets. NIM is net interest margin. Resi-
dential booms sample covers the period from 2000 to 2005. Controls included in the estimation but not reported include: ln
Assetst−1, Deposits/Assetst−1, Securities/Assetst−1, C&I/Assetst−1, Mortgages/Assetst−1, Unused Loan Commitments/Assetst−1, △
TotalBranches × Small Bank, △ TotalBranches × Big Bank, △I(Small Bank). Each of the controls is the quarterly average from the
previous year.
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Appendix 2: Data
CRA Census Tract Lending
Each bank that falls under the CRA reporting criteria is required to submit to the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) detailed information on each of the
new small business loans it has originated between January 1st and December 31st of each
year. A small business loan is defined as either a commercial and industrial (C&I) loan or
a loan secured by nonresidential real estate with amount of less than $1 million. The bank
is to disclose for each loan the location of the borrower (census tract) and the amount of
the loan that has been extended. This detailed information is processed by the FFIEC and
after extensive review for accuracy is released to the public. To preserve the privacy of the
customers of each bank the public information aggregates the total gross originations into
three categories – less than $100,000, between $100,000 and $250,000, and between $250,000
and $1,000,000. Only the totals within each category are reported. Additionally, the bank
reports total originations to firms with revenue below $1,000,000. This study uses all of
the small business loan originations by adding the total amounts originated in each of the
subcategories listed above. The geographical information is aggregated to the county level
where separate totals are reported for the metropolitan and the non-metropolitan area of
the county (if applicable). Within the MSA-county and the nonMSA-county areas further
distinction is made between the origination amounts extended across different income level
areas (based on the census tract income level). Since each bank is required to report the
census tracts and the income level at each census tract where at least one new loan was
extended I am able to decrease the level of aggregation in the public disclosures. This
information allows me to eliminate the census tracts where no loans are originated. The
total origination amounts for a given MSA-county or nonMSA-county across different income
levels are distributed equally to all of the census tracts according to the particular income
level. If there’s only one census tract with a particular income level within the county area
this census tract gets the precise amount of originations.
Branch Locations
The second source of data for this paper comes from the Summary of Deposits information
maintained by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). FDIC provides a list of
addresses of all active physical branches of all commercial banks and thrifts that are in
operation in a given year. For example, the 2000 file includes 85,493 branches of all banks
in operation28. Of the 85,493 locations about 86% have the precise branch GPS coordinates
while the remaining 14% only list an address. The branches with missing coordinates were
geo-coded separately for each year based on the US address29. Consequently, each of the
bank branches in operation for the period between 2000 and 2009 was associated with a
particular GPS-coordinate location30.
28This number excludes ATM locations.
29This was done with the geo-coding service SmartyStreets.
30Some of the addresses are not very accurate and this is reflected in the precision of the GPS coordinates.
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Matching Bank Networks Over the Sample Period
The final step in the creation of the dataset has to do with the associations of bank networks
over time. It is customary in this literature to use a method called force-merging that will
account for mergers and acquisitions of banks over the years. This method merges the
balance sheet of two or more banks in the year before the merger occurs and thus maintain
the relative size of the assets and liabilities between the two years. This paper deviates
from this practice. In what is described above, I have assumed that a given client of a bank
receives a loan from the closest super-branch of that bank. To use the force-merging method
I will have to assume that the client of a bank can choose to go to a super-branch of the
actual bank that has extended the loan or to a super-branch of the bank that merges with
the first bank in the following period. This is obviously inconsistent. The method that this
paper uses instead is to match the spatial distribution of a bank network at two different
points in time. The nodes of a network of a bank in one year are matched with only those
nodes that exist in the following year in the same location and belong to the same bank. The
dataset, therefore, only includes observations for networks that report under the CRA for
at least two consecutive years and at least one node of the network is in the same location
between the two years.
Aggregation of Census Tracts to ZIP Code Areas
The CRA information is provided at the census tract level while the CBP information on
the number of establishments is provided at the USPS ZIP code level. The census tracts
are slightly smaller than the ZIP areas so I aggregate the CRA information to the ZIP code
level. To do this I overlay the ZIP areas over the census tracts and compute the percentage
of the area of each ZIP area that is comprised of each census tract that overlaps with the
ZIP area. Average exposure is converted from the census tract level to the ZIP level using
percentage of total area as a weight.
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